Is this the beginning of the next Lebanon war?
We may be on the verge of a dangerous moment for Israel, but it is a moment that, if successful, just might change the face of the entire Middle East, and the world.
Shortly after October 7, Israel set two official goals: to return the hostages and to dismantle Hamas’s control of Gaza. As of this morning, the Security Cabinet has officially added a third goal: to safely return some 68,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in the north. This official change almost certainly means imminent war between Israel and Hezbollah, along with a number of other implications beyond a mere political declaration.
Before I continue - you may have noticed that we are in the midst of our Rosh HaShana fundraiser. You can check our fundraiser emails for details on all we’ve done over the past year (it's a LOT!) but for now I’ll just say: thank you so much for helping us help Israel! (Click HERE or on the button below to donate.) Now, back to the analysis…
*Photo: Lebanon border. AI image for illustrative purposes.
The first thing we learn from the Cabinet’s declaration is that war is likely. There are only two ways to return Israel’s residents to the north: war or a negotiated agreement. In the wake of October 7 it is unlikely that Israel’s northern residents would feel safe enough to return home on the basis of a written promise from Hezbollah. There was, after all, a ceasefire in place with Hamas on October 6. Even so, Hezbollah has made it clear that the terror group will not agree to a ceasefire until Hamas does so first, and that is not likely to happen at all.
Contrary to one widespread belief, the sticking point in negotiations with Hamas is not as simple as Israel’s insistence on holding the Philedelphi Corridor (the border area through which Hamas had, until recently, accessed Iranian resupply via Egypt).
According to the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, the corridor issue was only one of the 29 new “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the latest American-Israeli proposal, with 28 other objections related to a wide variety of additional substantive issues, including changes to Hamas’s own prior positions. In short, Hamas does not appear interested in any deal at all, a conclusion supported by a statement just minutes ago from Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, who claims, "The Israeli military is in a state of exhaustion, we won't touch a deal at any price."
Without a Hamas agreement there can be no Hezbollah agreement, which leaves only the military option.
Another implication from the Cabinet decision is that Israel has reached a turning point in Gaza. The IDF has long held to the “Ben Gurion Doctrine” of limiting offensive action to one front at a time, while keeping other fronts on defense or very limited offense. The fact that Israel may be ready to open another offensive front means that the IDF no longer considers Gaza to be a classic offensive theater.
It was long anticipated that Gaza would progress from a full scale war to a “counter-insurgency” against relatively disorganized remnants of the Hamas military machine. In Iraq, the United States discovered, to its detriment, that counter-insurgencies can be lengthy and deadly.
Israel seems to have learned some lessons from the American experience: rather than leaving Israeli troops in harm’s way and on constant defense, the IDF has instead removed much of its presence from Gaza, denying Hamas an easy target. As Hamas fighters regroup, Israel goes briefly back on offense, except now it's against an enemy that is less well armed and organized than before. For example, Israel re-entered the Shifa hospital complex last March, killing some 150 combatants and capturing 650, while losing only two IDF soldiers: a vastly different result from Israel’s first battle at Shifa in November. The Gaza theater has apparently evolved from a full scale war to a one-sided “war of attrition” in which Hamas progressively loses its numbers and resources, while the IDF does not.
A third implication of the Cabinet decision is that Israeli leadership feels an increased degree of confidence in its ability to face Hezbollah. At a tense Cabinet meeting shortly after October 7, the IDF pushed for an immediate, large-scale attack against Hezbollah, but Cabinet Ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot (both former IDF Chiefs of Staff) as well as Prime Minister Netanyahu, were strongly opposed. Though the Ministers did not reveal the specific reasons for their decision, here’s what we know: the Ben Gurion Doctrine mitigates against opening an offensive war on two fronts and at the time Gaza was considered the priority. Also, leaks indicated that there was pressure from the United States against such a war, and finally, a war against Hezbollah carries dangers to Israeli civilians far beyond those presented by Hamas.
*AI image for illustrative purposes.
For one thing, in a single day, Hezbollah can fire more rockets than Hamas did in an entire month, enough to overwhelm the Iron Dome missile defense system. For another, Hezbollah has long range, guided missiles and drones — capable of taking out electricity, communications, water, roads (that transport food), and, of course, large numbers of Israeli civilians. Finally, without the protection of Iron Dome, Israel would have to be far more aggressive about destroying rocket launchers, resulting in far greater Lebanese civilian casualties (and, as a result, far greater international pressure) compared to Gaza.
So what’s changed?
Over the past 11 months the IDF has not merely been engaging in “tit for tat” exchanges of rocketfire on the northern border, but has strategically targeted a great deal of Hezbollah’s weapons and resources, including killing more fighters than in the entire 2006 Lebanon War. This strategy came to a dramatic peak just before dawn on Sunday morning, August 25, when the IDF flew into Lebanon and destroyed a massive Hezbollah missile and drone volley minutes before it left the ground. It was later revealed that this operation also destroyed a great deal of Hezbollah’s reserve stockpiles. Not only has the terror organization been significantly weakened, but the August 25 operation provided a proof of concept that Israel can stop much of Hezbollah’s offensive capability prior to launch. These advantages, combined with the current evacuation of Israel’s northern residents, present a rare opportunity to attack Hezbollah with reduced risk to the Israeli home front.
The Global view: Last week Israel launched a stunning operation in Masyaf, Syria: striking not only from the air, but actually landing special forces, who then entered and destroyed an Iranian weapons factory located deep inside a mountain – by blowing it up from the inside. This configuration is similar to Iran’s nuclear sites, which are widely believed to be located under Iran’s Zagros mountains: making them difficult to destroy from the air, but vulnerable to exactly this type of ground operation. Iran’s key deterrent against an Israeli strike has long been the presence of Hezbollah and its massive arsenal on Israel’s northern border. Taking Hezbollah “off the “chessboard” could open the door to a “Masyaf style” strike by Israel on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The IDF has yet to initiate a massive call-up of reservists, the last clear sign before an impending ground operation. But winter is coming, and some believe the IDF will insist on completing this operation before that time, to ensure optimal operating conditions.
In short, we may be on the verge of a dangerous moment for Israel, but it is a moment that, if successful, just might change the face of the entire Middle East, and the world.